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Chapter 5: Possibility in Kierkegaard’s imaginative 
discourses  
 
Belief and doubt are not two different types of knowledge that can be determined in continuity 
with each other, because neither of them is a cognitive act; they are opposite passions.  
 
-Johannes Climacus, Philosophical Crumbs, 1843-41 
 
From what does pure thinking abstract? From existence, consequently from what it is supposed 
to explain. 
 
-Johannes Climacus, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Crumbs, 18462 
 
 When Lukács includes Kierkegaard’s imaginary diaries and short stories in his pantheon 
of the great ‘essays of life’ one cannot help but think that Kierkegaard would have been pleased 
to find himself in the company of ‘Plato’s Dialogues, the texts of the mystics, [and] Montaigne’s 
Essays’ (1974, p. 3). Certainly, Kierkegaard saw himself as a Socrates for his age, and a brief 
glance at his pseudonyms – Johannes de Silentio, Johannes Climacus, Anti-Climacus – reveals 
the influence of the Christian mystical tradition on his writings. Though scholars disagree about 
the level of Kierkegaard’s direct engagement with Montaigne,3 the similarities in form and 
sceptical method are undeniable. Yet Kierkegaard’s writings also stand apart from the rest of the 
cited authors in his use of pseudonyms and fictional characters to advance his ideas. Might this 
move into the literary disqualify Kierkegaard as a philosophical essayist? As Lukács reminds us, 
essayistic writings as such already involve a literary element, which he calls, by turns, art or 
poetry—defined by a concern with the form of the text that is not shared by the scientific 
neutrality to which he opposes the artistic.4 Claire de Obaldia argues further that the ‘occasional’, 
polyphonic, and anti-systematic nature of the essay leads to the historical development of the 
novel, which transforms the multiple voices of a singular writing ‘I’ into fully-fledged fictional 
                                                      1 Kierkegaard, 1985, p. 84. 
 2 Kierkegaard, 1992, p. 328.   3 See Grimsley (1966) and Landkildehus (2009) for more on Kierkegaard’s engagement with 
Montaigne. Grimsley makes a stronger case for Kierkegaard’s close study of the Essais, especially ‘Apology for 
Raimond Sebond’, while Lankildehus interprets the existing evidence to suggest that Kierkegaard was a more 
casual reader of Montaigne. Both acknowledge the similarities of theme and form in the two authors.  
 4 While Lukács’s distinction between the scientific and the artistic on the level of form is convincing, 
his too-neat division of artistic creation and the scientific truth both makes too little of the artist’s claim to truth 
and too much of the scientist’s, as Adorno notes in ‘Essay as Form’. Lukács claims that although the essay is of 
necessity artistic or poetic, it is nevertheless distinguished from art by its concern with linking life as lived to 
life as such, moving from occasions and concrete images to the ‘true life of the soul’ or the ‘ultimate questions’. 
However, Lukács fails to appreciate that this same dynamic can be operative in any example of poetic or 
pictorial representation.  
  2 
characters, dialogues, and situations. In their wholly imaginative frame, novels are a natural 
extension of the essay’s refusal to resolve in advance different ways of seeing. Schlegel’s Lucinde 
and Novalis’s Heinrich von Ofterdingen were experimental novels of ideas that staged the 
philosophical insights of German Romanticism in a dramatic way, offering an imaginative mode 
of reader engagement. Kierkegaard’s quasi-novelistic writings take part in this tradition of 
literary-philosophical hybrids that seem calculated to defy classification. By creating fictional 
‘authors’ who embody particular life views, Kierkegaard advances existing strands of the 
essayistic, particularly polyvocality. The multiplicity of voices and the profusion of ironic, 
disjunctive structures within his texts furthers the anti-systematic, sceptical agenda of the texts 
we have already studied. 
 Kierkegaard is well-known for his critique of ‘the System’—a term that targets Hegelian 
idealism and the metaphysical tradition more broadly in its tendency to privilege being over 
existence or becoming, or to cover over the gap between the two. Like Montaigne and Hume, 
Kierkegaard worries that the temporal structure of everyday life is supressed by certain ways of 
speaking (philosophically), that the imposition of a conceptual structure onto lived experience 
can distort what one sets out to understand. Kierkegaard’s stated aim of combatting the System 
‘by means of form’ (1985, p. 117) works by exploiting the literary possibilities of the essayistic in 
order to gesture toward those features of existence that escape conceptualisation: possibility, the 
particular or subjective, and religious faith. Like the other authors in this study, especially the 
Frühromantiker who (along with 18th-century ironists such as Lessing and Hamann) inspired his 
ironic-polemical tone, Kierkegaard took form to be a matter of the utmost concern for the 
project of philosophy, seeing the choice of presentation as both an assertion of the conditions 
under which philosophy ought to begin and, implicitly, an ethical judgement of whether and how 
the truth can be learned or communicated. Kierkegaard emphatically rejects the notion that 
philosophical truth ought to be neutral or indifferent to the individual in the manner of scientific 
truth; like the great essayists and moralistes who precede him, he affirms that a subject’s 
knowledge of himself in relation to his own historical moment – including existing conventions, 
structures, and texts – must form the basis for philosophical enquiry. Likewise, he rejects 
objective or neutral discourse, the discourse of disembodied, de-subjectivised authority, which 
covers over communication as a problem and denies the hermeneutic insight that all 
communication is interested, defined in advance by the cultural parameters of language use and by 
the commitments of an individual author/reader. For Kierkegaard as for the Frühromantiker, a 
philosophical writer who fails to recognise these commitments is left in a default position of 
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dogmatism,5 an offence for which he takes 19th-century Hegelian philosophy to task. 
Kierkegaard turns away from the project of establishing objective truth, the truth of ‘the System’, 
and instead asks the question of the significance of truth for the finite, existing subject, the 
ancient question of the value of knowledge for life. Rather than accept the false transcendence of 
abstraction or speculation, which achieves the eternal by removing the subject from time, he 
attempts to clear the way for a genuine opening or transcendence within the everyday.  
 
Doubt and faith 
 Kierkegaard is a writer preoccupied with the consequences of a tendency in both 
philosophy and in the prevailing religious attitudes of his time to ignore what it means to exist, to 
ignore the subject as a possibility to be realised. In the preface to Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard, 
writing under the pseudonym Johannes de Silentio, mounts an attack against those who would 
attempt to ‘go further’ than doubt or faith. He attributes this desire to ‘go further’ to a failure to 
appreciate the difficulty of both doubt and faith in the contemporary intellectual and cultural 
climate of 19th-century Denmark, which he describes as a ‘regular clearance sale’ of ideas (1994, 
p. 3). He saw a culture of scientific optimism, quick to treat the problems of philosophy and 
religion as if they had already been worked out and needed just ‘one more stone’6 or one more 
commentary to reach completion; perhaps next Sunday the System – the total understanding of 
subject and world – would be finished (1992, p. 106).7 In a move that is typical of Kierkegaard’s 
approach to philosophical questions, de Silentio translates the question of doubting to the level 
of the individual and asks how doubt is ever to be overcome – or even entered into – by the 
existential subject. Posing the same question about faith, de Silentio remarks, ‘Even though one 
were capable of converting the whole content of faith into the form of a concept, it does not 
follow that one has adequately conceived faith and understands how one got into it, or how it 
got into one’ (Ibid.). The equivalence of doubt and faith that runs through the preface, though 
                                                     
 5 Kierkegaard’s rejection of the possibility of neutral discourse also takes to heart Jacobi’s suggestion 
that non-conceptual conviction is a precondition for orienting oneself in the world, since it is only this kind of 
basic interest or passion that allows one to break free from the infinite regress of rational reflection. 
 6 In the preface to Johannes Climacus, the unnamed author declares, ‘Someone who supposes that 
philosophy has never in all the world been so close as it is now to fulfilling its task of explaining all mysteries 
may certainly think it strange, affected, and scandalous that I choose the narrative form and do not in my small 
way hand up a stone to culminate the system’ (Kierkegaard, 1985, p. 117). 
 7 As a religious thinker, Kierkegaard specifically rejected the notion that one could be born into the 
Christian faith by virtue of being born in a Christian country (Denmark), as opposed to ‘working out [one’s] 
salvation in fear and trembling’. The immediate philosophical target of de Silentio’s remarks is H.L. Martensen, 
a prominent Danish Hegelian who taught that the Hegelian dialectic represented a triumph over doubt, thus 
reducing scepticism to a mere moment in the system; within this framework, ‘going further’ was conceived as 
integral to the practice of philosophy. See H.L. Martensen’s review of J.L. Heiberg’s ‘Introductory Lectures to 
Speculative Logic’, Danske Maanedskrift, No. 16 for 1836, pp. 515ff. For a discussion of Kierkegaard’s critique 
of Martensen, see Stewart, 2003, pp. 261ff.   
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never explicitly stated, is a significant rhetorical feature. De Silentio begins by considering the 
philosophical cheapening of doubt as an intellectual curiosity rather than a way of inhabiting the 
world, and proceeds to take up parallel discussion of faith in the same terms. The rationale for 
treating doubt and faith as twin movements is hardly self-evident from a philosophical 
perspective, since the foil of doubt is generally imagined to be certainty, certain knowledge. What 
Neil Gascoigne terms the ‘heroic’ response to scepticism purports to dispel sceptical doubt by 
establishing an ultimate ground for knowledge claims either in some rational principle or in 
direct access to sense data;8 the assumption is that the problem of doubt could be solved by 
agreement on the proper criteria of justification.   
 De Silentio’s performative aim in treating doubt and faith as interchangeable is to suggest 
that the philosophical understanding of doubt as a problem of knowledge is hopelessly skewed: 
the way to recover from doubt is not through more certain knowledge, nor through the 
progressive acquisition of knowledge, but through the twin movement of acknowledgement of 
the inevitable fracture between thought and being, and faith or radical openness, akin to Jacobi’s 
salto mortale. Moreover, it is suggested that rather than ‘going further’ than doubt, we (readers) 
would be wise to attempt doubting in earnest. De Silentio admires Descartes and the ancient 
sceptics, for whom doubting was not only an achievement but also the task of a lifetime, 
requiring constant renewal in the face of what Kierkegaard in his journals describes as ‘the 
inveiglements of cognition’ (1985, p. 262/Pap. IV B 10: 18 n.d.).9  
 As Danish bishops such as Kierkegaard’s former tutor H.L. Martensen were claiming 
victory over religious doubt as a mastered historical moment, as Hegel had done for scepticism, 
De Silentio proclaims that he ‘has not understood the System, does not know whether it actually 
exists, whether it is completed’ and insists that his own text ‘has nothing whatever to do with the 
System.’10 He denies readers a conceptual treatment of doubt or faith that would add to their 
                                                     
 8 Hegel, influenced by the Frühromantik critiques of idealism, saw the absolute principle as 
progressive, as the end toward which philosophy would strive, rather than something given at the beginning. But 
unlike the Romantics, he conceived of this end of absolute knowing as not only achievable but logically 
necessary.  
 9 Kierkegaard takes up this subject in his 1842-1843 journals, the period during which he was 
composing Johannes Climacus, his most targeted treatment of sceptical doubt. ‘It was life’s task to keep on 
doubting despite all the inveiglements of cognition. Therefore, in a certain sense they were never finished [...] it 
is different when this doubting everything is supposed to be the beginning’ (1992, p. 262). In an journal entry 
from the same period, Kierkegaard indirectly accuses philosophy of trying to wheedle its way out of the anxiety 
of doubt: ‘has Descartes done it for all of us in the same way that Christ was crucified?’ (1985, p. 246/Pap. IV B 
2: 16).  
 10 This remark should be read in light of Johannes Climacus’ critique of Hegel in Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript: ‘[I]f the conclusion is lacking at the end, it is also lacking at the beginning [...] but if the 
conclusion is lacking at the beginning, this means that there is no system. A house can indeed be finished even 
though a bell pull is lacking, but in a scholarly construction the lack of a conclusion has retroactive power to 
make the beginning doubtful and hypothetical, that is, unsystematic’ (Kierkegaard, 1992, p. 13). 
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knowledge and instead asks the question of what is at stake for the subject in these positions, or 
rather, movements. The worry with both doubt and faith is that one mistakenly tries to ‘quantify 
oneself into’ them and so changes what must be continually renewed ‘into something else, into 
another kind of certainty’ (1992, p. 11). In a move that is indicative of Kierkegaard’s turn toward 
the subject as possibility, De Silentio aims to ‘raise the price’ of both doubt and faith by using a 
variety of rhetorical means to present them as live existential possibilities.  
 
 
‘Interested’ communication 
 The treatment of doubt and faith as poles of the same existential activity – which is 
consistent across the pseudonymous works and the journals – gives Kierkegaard’s writing a 
therapeutic shape. While his writings do not, like the therapy of the ancient Pyrrhonians, 
recommend falling back on the conventional practices of the everyday, or living ‘naturally’, both 
Kierkegaardian and Pyrrhonian therapy work to disabuse readers of the notion that there is any 
conceptual or philosophical solution to the question: when does one know enough to really 
know? Put another way, Kierkegaard shares with Pyrrhonism the insight that knowledge is 
inadequate to address the problem of how to orient oneself in the world.  
 Kierkegaard – both in the journals and through his meta-pseudonym Johannes Climacus 
– accepts the basic sceptical argument that positive knowledge claims are ultimately groundless, 
since ‘sense certainty’ is a ‘delusion’ (1992, p. 81) and, as Jacobi had argued, foundationalism 
does not offer a way of halting the infinite regress of rational reflection (Ibid., p. 116, pp. 328ff). 
As a result, suspension or withholding of judgement is the only rational conclusion of 
philosophical investigation. Climacus adds to these critiques his own thesis that positive 
knowledge claims – sense certainty, historical knowledge, or speculative knowledge – are illusory 
because they ‘fail to express the state of the knowing subject in existence’ (1992, p. 81). 
Climacus’s objection centres on the temporal dimension of subjectivity as explored by 
Montaigne and the Romantics: the subject never exists as a fully realised actuality, is never fully 
present to itself, but is only in the process of becoming. Positive knowledge claims, which assert 
a truth about being or what is, thus stand in contradiction with the negative state of becoming 
that characterises subjectivity. In order to claim certain knowledge of anything11, one must 
transform oneself into a ‘fictitious object subject, and to mistake oneself for such a subject is to 
be fooled and to remain fooled’ (1992, p. 81). Transforming the I of the existing subject into an I 
                                                     
 11 Climacus makes an exception for the claim ‘I exist’, which he finds consistent with subjectivity, but 
asserts that one cannot extrapolate from this claim a speculative I or a necessary I as various species of idealism 
attempted to do (1992, p. 81).  
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that is an object for itself (an object for thought) is precisely the error for which Novalis and the 
Frühromantiker criticise Fichtean idealism;12 this error is perpetuated in any system that locates its 
ground in the I of self-reflection but forgets that self-reflection is a process of ‘reciprocal 
determination [Wechselbeweis]’13 and so forgets that the I is always doubled, never self-identical.14 
The consequence of the non-identical, deferred status of the I for the Frühromantiker is that any 
hope of a closed philosophical system must be replaced with infinite striving or infinite 
approximation toward a poetic-philosophical Book of Books made of accumulated fragments. 
Kierkegaard is in some ways more radical – and far less optimistic – than his Romantic 
forebears, displacing the hope for a supreme Work with a more resolutely negative literary 
strategy of taking away knowledge, leading his readers to aporia. Infinite striving remains an apt 
characterisation of the subject’s position, but in Kierkegaard this requires a rupture from 
philosophy and an opening toward faith.   
 As we have already seen, the Romantics developed a heterogeneous ‘system of 
fragments’ to represent the necessarily open-ended structure of existence. Rhetorically, they used 
irony as a way of resisting the ‘urge to unity’ that would smooth over the real differences 
between the absolute and the existing subject. Kierkegaard too develops his style with the aim of 
keeping alive the tension of possibility and striving that defines existence. In praise of the 18th-
century playwright and philosopher (and notorious ironist) Lessing, Kierkegaard’s Climacus 
declares that ‘Lessing and the systematician,15 both speak of a continued striving—the only 
difference is that Lessing is obtuse or truthful enough to call it a continued striving, the 
systematician sagacious and untruthful enough to call it a system’ (1992, p. 108). To better 
illustrate the bad faith existential position of the systematician, Climacus offers a joke about a 
man who loses a silk umbrella and, in order to have the best chances of reclaiming it, advertises 
that he has lost a cotton umbrella instead. Climacus provides his own gloss on the joke: perhaps 
the ‘systematising’ philosopher hopes to sell more copies by advertising his work as an ‘absolute 
system’ rather than what it really is: the attempt at or approximation of a system.16 In this case 
the parable is an odd fit, since the man with the missing umbrella advertises something cheaper 
than what he actually owns, whereas the philosopher advertises something more than he is able 
to deliver. However, it must be borne in mind that for Kierkegaard the object of greater worth is 
                                                     
 12 Novalis, 1978, II: p. 9 
 13 Schlegel, KFSA XVIII, 1963, p. 518: 16 
 14 ‘Principien sind immer im Plural, konstruiren such unter einander; nie nur Eins, wie die 
Grundwüthigen wähnen’ (KFSA XVIII, 2006, p. 395: 105).   
 15 Kierkegaard does not give his ‘systematician’ a name, but Hegel, or some contemporary Danish 
Hegelian, is the most likely target.  
 16 Kierkegaard had come to the same conclusion as F. Schlegel: ‘Jedes System ist nur Approximation 
seines Ideals. Die ‘Skepsis ist ewig’ (KFSA XVIII, 2006, p. 417: 1149). 
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not ‘the System’ but the continual striving of the existing subject. Read on this level the 
systematic philosopher has ‘lost’ himself and has erroneously tried to recover the subjectivity that 
he has lost by transforming it into a speculative ‘I-I’; the latter is much ‘cheaper’ and requires far 
less effort than the task of becoming or realising oneself in existence, for ‘to think abstractly is 
easier than to exist’ (1992, p. 308). The joke is an illustration of the danger of systematic thought 
that replaces what it sets out to explain with an inferior substitute. The very terms of the 
investigation ensure that the object sought will never be recovered. 
 For Kierkegaard as for Jacobi and the Romantics, non-conceptual conviction or what 
Kierkegaard calls interest [Interesse] is a precondition for acting in the world. Scepticism itself is, 
for Kierkegaard, a version of the interested commitment exemplified by faith. In his 1842-1843 
journals, he distinguishes between ignorance, uncertainty, and doubt in order to establish the 
element of willing in doubt and to suggest that doubt, properly understood, cannot be insulated 
from the sphere of practical action. Doubt is described as ‘a higher element of uncertainty’ in 
that ‘I determine my relation to a thing—[and] I do not determine it in uncertainty’ (1985, p. 
262). As a decisive orientation, doubting implies responsibility for my own possibility, giving 
meaning to contingency. ‘Doubt is the beginning of the ethical, for as soon as I am to act, the 
interest lies with me inasmuch as I assume the responsibility and thereby acquire significance’ 
(Ibid, p. 265). As it relates to communication, this insight leads to the conclusion that the object 
of philosophical writing is not to provide knowledge or to guarantee the truth of what is said by 
the elaboration of a method; rather, it is to address the subject’s relationship or commitment to 
what is known. For ‘even if the system were absolutely perfect, even if the actuality [Virkelighed] 
exceeded the advance reports, doubt would still not be overcome – it only begins – for doubt is 
based on interest, and all systematic knowledge is disinterested’ (1992, p. 170).17 This focus on 
the subjective and on doubt as an expression of interest is meant as a reaction against the notion 
that sceptical doubt could be overcome by a more philosophically rigorous process of 
justification that would ensure that one were ‘getting reality right’. In opposition to this tendency, 
Kierkegaard’s rhetorical strategy often takes the form of Socratically leading his readers to doubt, 
since doubt at the very least requires staking one’s claim, which for Kierkegaard is the 
precondition for any kind of genuine philosophical or ethical engagement.    
                                                     
 17 See Johannes Climacus: ‘In this respect he considered the conduct of the Greek sceptics far more 
consistent than the modern overcoming of doubt. They were well aware that doubt is based on interest, and 
therefore with perfect consistency they thought they could cancel doubt by transforming it into apathy 
(ataraxia). In this method there was a consistency, whereas it was an inconsistency [...] that motivated modern 
philosophy to want to conquer doubt systematically. Even if the system were absolutely perfect, even if the 
actuality [Virkelighed] exceeded the advance reports, doubt would still not be overcome –it only begins – for 
doubt is based on interest, and all systematic knowledge is disinterested’ (1992, p. 170).   
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 As the pseudonymous Climacus explores in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, the gap 
between a neutral mathematical proposition such as 2+2=4 and an account of existence is a gap 
of interest, of something at stake for the subject; thus in the latter case, ‘the object of 
communication is consequently not a knowledge but a realisation’ (1967, p. 272: 649). The 
question of the how of truth raised by essayistic writing and, more proximately, by Jacobi and the 
German Romantic tradition, is paramount for Kierkegaard and his task of making readers aware 
of the commitments that shape their way of being in and interrogating the world. The same 
concerns about the existential significance of truth that led the Romantics to reject a Grundsatz for 
philosophy and to orient themselves toward a whole18 leads Kierkegaard to emphasise the 
subjective appropriation of truth. Both recognised that idealism – in the case of the Romantics, 
that of Fichte and Reinhold, and in Kierkegaard’s case that of Hegel – sacrificed an existential 
subject for a conceptual I, unwittingly giving up on the possibility of a philosophy grounded in 
and able to address itself to the existing person and unwittingly eliminating freedom or 
possibility. ‘For Kierkegaard, metaphysics, ethics, and theology – in short the length and breadth 
of the “onto-theo-logic” – shatter against the rocks of [subjective] “interest”’ (Caputo, 1987, p. 
33).19 The unity and coherence that Fichte and Hegel were able to achieve was for their critics 
nothing more than a philosophical sleight of hand; the ethical-aesthetic project of Bildung – in 
Kierkegaard the project of opbyggelige (edifying or upbuilding) – sought to redress this wrong with 
a philosophy that would acknowledge the open structure of existence and its absolute difference 
from conceptual thought. 
  
Plurality and irony 
 Kierkegaard realises the literary possibilities of the essayistic mode, developing the 
characteristic multiplicity of perspectives and voices into fully-fledged fictional characters—both 
his pseudonyms and the fictional characters within his works. The shift from discursive writing 
to fictional narratives is an example of the continuum of possibilities for essayistic writing and 
the ease with which the imaginative consideration of different points of view in authors such as 
Montaigne and Hume can be developed into novelistic techniques. Though Kierkegaard is the 
first of the authors examined in this study to use pseudonymous characters,20 his motive for this 
development is familiar. Montaigne featured as a character in his essays in order to show the 
non-identity of the individual subject. The heterogeneous unity of the Romantic fragments was 
                                                     
 18 See Chapter 4. 
 19 See Repetition, 2009, p. 19.  
 20 As noted in the beginning of this chapter, Schlegel and Novalis had already experimented with 
writing philosophical novels.  
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an attempt to represent the successive unfolding of truth for the subject in time. Kierkegaard’s 
pseudonymous characters allow for a polyphony of voices and a heterogeneity of perspectives 
on the same themes of non-identity and temporal existence. Furthering the Romantic move to 
combat the ‘Trieb nach Einheit’ (Schlegel, KF 103) or the appeal to objective authority by 
removing an author, Kierkegaard invents multiple authors, multiple personalities, none of whom 
claim any final authority. His richly conceived pseudonyms are an example of the focus on the 
subject as the site of truth; through heterogeneous perspectives, Kierkegaard raises the question, 
not of how we can know enough to be sure of what we know, but of how we come to see the 
world under a certain aspect, as well as how we might learn to see in a new way.  
 Each of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms speaks in the first person, enacting his commitment 
to placing ‘I’s into the middle of life’ since it is ‘completely lacking in our age for someone to say: 
I’ (1967, p. 302: 656/Pap. VIII. 2 B 88 n.d.). Yet it would be a mistake to read the pseudonyms as 
embodiments of stable identities or fixed ways of life, e.g. the aesthetic, ethical, and religious. 
Rather, in every case, Kierkegaard uses the pseudonyms to explore a certain kind of movement: 
the possibility of becoming other than one is, which is a live possibility for the subject qua 
subject. Kierkegaard is above all a philosopher of becoming, for whom timeless, eternal 
categories such as identity can be of use only to logic, not to the existing subject.  
 
As long as I live in time, the principle of identity is only an abstraction. Therefore 
nothing is easier than to delude oneself and others into thinking the identity of all by 
abandoning diversity. Nevertheless, one might ask such a person how he conducts 
himself with regard to living, since in identity I am beyond time [...] The confusion 
arises only from living in categories different from those used in writing books—O 
wretched book-writing! (1967, p. 329: 705) 
 
The concerns about identity in this passage – both the identity that comes from transforming a 
subject into an object ‘beyond time’ through reifying reflection, and the dangerous urge to unify 
everything in thought by ignoring difference – resonate with those of the essayists we have 
already considered. As a means of combatting philosophy’s tendency to abandon diversity and 
think everything under the category of an eidos, Kierkegaard adopts a rhetorical strategy of 
plunging the reader into the tension of temporal life and becoming through the use of 
conflicting perspectives (within and across works) and through gestures of ironic reflexivity. The 
inherent comedy of writing books to combat book writing does not escape Kierkegaard, who 
sometimes suggests that keeping silent would be the best response of all. Yet his version of 
‘book writing’ is an attempt to maintain difference and to heighten, rather than level out, a sense 
of the self as possibility. The dialectical movements within each text strain the boundaries of 
how each pseudonymous author understands himself. As the characters end up revealing the 
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limitations of their own perspectives, the reader is given a model for transformative self-
reflection. Though Kierkegaard’s ultimate aim as an author is to open the possibility of Christian 
truth,21 this takes place primarily through negative gestures of subtraction or breaking down, 
which strip away the illusions of self-presence and certainty that prevent genuine opening or 
transcendence.  
 The novelistic strategy of fictional characters involves what Kierkegaard describes as an 
ethical deception—a kind of lie that tells the truth or can lead to the truth. ‘”To deceive into the 
truth.” [...] Ethical communication in character begins with placing a “deception” in between 
[the teacher and the learner], and the art consists in enduring everything while remaining faithful 
to character in the deception and faithful to the ethical’ (Kierkegaard, 1967, 1: p 288: 24). The 
development of characters that do not represent the author’s actual position but that may be able 
to help the reader to a moment of recognition reflects Kierkegaard’s heightened awareness of the 
hazards of communication, and written communication in particular. He conceives of 
communication as an art, in which truth or untruth resides in the form.22 For Kierkegaard, in 
addition to the dangers of language, which as the medium of the universal threatens to erase the 
particular, an author faces the additional difficulty that ‘there is really nothing people want to do 
more than to mimic’ (1967, p. 274: 649: 24). In order to make philosophical writing existentially 
significant for the reader, Kierkegaard resorts to the art of irony, championed by the 
Frühromantiker.  
 Romantic irony, as it relates to the practice of writing, denotes gestures of self-
consciousness or self-reflection in which an author goes beyond the established frame of the 
work. Texts like Tristram Shandy or Don Quixote that constantly comment on their own 
composition are frequently cited by the Romantics as the paradigm of romantic or ironic writing. 
The ability to abstract from one’s immediate circumstances is considered a measure of aesthetic 
and intellectual refinement. In the Kritische Fragmente, Schlegel cautions against the enthusiasm 
that simply wants to ‘blurt out everything’ and recommends aesthetic distance: ‘in order to write 
well about something, one shouldn’t be interested in it any longer’ (KF 37). Schlegel uses the 
more direct terms ‘deception’ and ‘dissimulation’ (KF 108) to describe the shape that Romantic 
works ought to take. For Kierkegaard as for Schlegel, irony is a licensed form of ‘deception’ 
                                                     
 21 See the posthumously published Point of View for my Work as an Author, in which Kierkegaard 
claims: ‘that I am and was a religious author, that the whole of my work as an author is related to Christianity, 
to the problem “of becoming a Christian”, with a direct or indirect polemic against the monstrous illusion that 
we call Christendom, or against the illusion that in such a land as ours we are Christians of a sort’ (Kierkegaard, 
1998, pp. 5-6). 
 22 ‘The man who says what is true can act as foolishly as the one who says what is untrue: we are 
talking about the way you say it not what you say. My humour is to consider the form as much as the substance, 
and the barrister as much as his case, as Alcibiades told us’ (Montaigne, 1992, p. 370, III: 8). 
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because, as Schlegel explains, ‘it is meant to deceive no one except those who consider it a 
deception and who either take pleasure in the delightful roguery of making fools of the whole 
world or else become angry when they get an inkling they themselves might be included’ (KF 
108). The deception involved in irony – the breaking of the narrative illusion in a fictional work 
or the humorous or disorienting introduction of incongruous perspectives in a discursive work – 
is thus a way of challenging the accepted terms of a discourse, since the opening up of a new 
perspective casts into doubt or relativises the existing frame. For both Kierkegaard and the 
Romantics, Socrates –‘playful and serious, guilelessly open and deeply hidden’ (Schlegel, 1971, p. 
155) – was the model for how irony could enrich the practice of philosophy, constantly shifting 
the terrain to take away the possibility of certainty or complacency.   
 In Kierkegaard’s works, the author – whether a pseudonym or Kierkegaard as a 
fictionalised writing subject in his ‘direct’ works – is present both in the use of the first person 
and in various narrative techniques of what Schlegel calls permanent irony or parabasis: intrusions of 
the author or ‘interruption[s] of a discourse by a shift in rhetorical register (de Man, 1996, p. 169, 
178)’ that break up a unified reading of the texts and alienate text from reader. The philosophical 
import of such ironic gestures is that they demonstrate the freedom of self-reflection to always 
go beyond itself while at the same time exposing the necessarily limited nature of any given 
frame of reference. The ironist ‘remains faithful to the ethical’ in that the ultimate goal of irony is 
to make the reader aware of her own freedom. For Kierkegaard, this is the ‘highest relationship 
one human could have to another’ (1985, pp. 10-11). When Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous 
authors lack the appearance of earnestness (the author ‘first and foremost does not seem to be 
an earnest man’ (1967, p. 274: 649: 24)) and present perspectives that are ultimately limited or 
erroneous, the reader is put at a distance from the text, in much the same way as an unreliable 
narrator complicates the reading of a novel. The discerning reader cannot remain passive but is 
forced into an active role of determining the meaning of the text in a dialectical relationship with 
the narrator, who cannot be relied upon as an authority. Kierkegaard declares that ‘one can never 
mimic an ironist, for he is a Proteus who incessantly alters the deception’ (1967, p. 274: 649: 24). 
This Protean quality is characteristic of the way in which he approaches his authorship: changing 
masks, alternating perspectives and rhetorical modes in order to force the reader into activity. 
Kierkegaard’s preoccupation with form suggests the ethical impossibility of bringing another 
person along in any direct sense and the simultaneous impossibility of giving up on the task of 
communicating. According to F. Schlegel, irony, in constantly opening the possibility of other 
perspectives, ‘contains and arouses a feeling of indissoluble antagonism [...] between the 
impossibility and the necessity of complete communication’ (KF 108).  
  12 
 Kierkegaard’s use of multiple perspectives, a feature of all essayistic texts, functions as 
parabasis in disrupting the possibility of a unified reading. One of the most distinctive features of 
Kierkegaard’s style is the division of his texts into numerous sections that approach a problem 
from either a different philosophical or a different rhetorical angle and break with what came 
before, sometimes in the form of an explicit retraction.23 Either/Or (1843), perhaps the work in 
Kierkegaard’s oeuvre that most resembles a book of classical essays, exploits this disjunctive 
mode of presentation to great effect. The work offers no fewer than nine autonomous texts—in 
the ‘Either’ half of the work alone. From the aesthetically-minded author known only as ‘A’ or 
‘The Young Man’, there are thematic essays on boredom (‘The Rotation of Crops’) and the role 
of chance in artistic production (‘First Love’), a series of fragments after the fashion of the 
Frühromantik (‘Diapsalmata’), and an essay of musical criticism on Mozart’s Don Giovanni (‘The 
Musical Erotic’). Also included in this half of the work is a series of letters and journal entries 
from a second character called Johannes and his lover Cordelia (‘The Seducer’s Diary’). Like the 
Young Man, Johannes embodies the aesthetic life, but in the more calculated form of a seducer, 
for whom actuality – and flesh-and-blood women – are valued only as material for aesthetic 
contemplation. The ‘Or’ half of the work presents a defence of marriage and the ethical life from 
a Judge Wilhelm, in response to the young man of the first half of the work. The last subdivision 
of ‘Or’ is a sermon, written by an unnamed pastor friend of the Judge, which introduces a 
religious perspective into the work that departs from both the aesthetic and the ethical. Finally, 
the whole work is framed by an introduction from the editor Victor Eremita, who, having found 
the assembled papers in the drawer of an antique desk, offers his own interpretation of the good 
life, in tune with the Judge. Kierkegaard includes an additional frame narrative in the work, as ‘A’ 
accidentally discovers and then decides to publish the diary of his friend Johannes (the ‘seducer’). 
The frame-within-frame structure is typical of the kind of highly reflexive novels that the 
Frühromantiker celebrated,24 whose narratives are interrupted with digressions at every 
opportunity. The excessive multiplication of frames gives the reader a heightened awareness of 
points-of view without providing any direction for how to navigate or resolve the perspectives, 
thus reproducing the tension of lived experience and providing a fictional space within which to 
                                                     
 23 Kierkegaard’s works include an excessive amount of paratextual material – prefaces, introductions, 
‘attunements’, preambles, and ‘preliminary expectorations’ – that identify the author’s point of view (‘I am a 
poet’ ‘I am a midwife’ ‘I am not philosopher’ ‘I am not a Christian’) and sometimes threaten to swallow up the 
whole of a work. In 1844 Kierkegaard published an entire book of prefaces entitled Prefaces: Light Reading for 
People in Various Estates According to Time and Opportunity. Elaborate subtitles – ‘a mimical-pathetical-
dialectical compilation’, a ‘Christian psychological exposition for edification and awakening’ – also reflect an 
interest in experimenting with different generic approaches.  
 24 These are also the effects favoured by postmodern authors such as John Barthes, Jorge Luis Borges, 
and Thomas Pynchon.  
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‘assay’ different points of view. Kierkegaard’s meta-pseudonym Climacus comments on the form 
of Either/Or: ‘That there is no conclusion and no final decision is an indirect expression for truth 
as inwardness and in this way perhaps a polemic against truth as knowledge’ (1992, p. 252). As 
with all instances of irony, and particularly the species of pervasive irony or parabasis in 
Kierkegaard’s texts, the ‘inward’ work of appropriation is left to the reader. Climacus’ separation 
of truth from knowledge in this remark reflects the overall therapeutic shape of Kierkegaard’s 
project, which forms a part of the wider shift away from truth as certain knowledge in the 
tradition of essayistic writings.  
 Eremita’s frame narrative is worthy of further attention, as it provides additional insight 
into Kierkegaard’s authorial strategy. The frame narrative is a classic technique of epistolary, 
another genre in the essayistic mode; like his counterpart in Les Liaisons dangereuses, Eremita 
claims to have organised the papers he discovered in what he takes to be chronological order, 
but he otherwise leaves them unedited. Kierkegaard’s use of the frame device is twofold. Firstly, 
he seeks to prevent the reception of Either/Or as a systematic, or even recognisable, work of 
philosophy. The reader is encouraged to see the text as the product of a chance series of events: 
‘A’ saving the original papers, Eremita choosing to buy this desk and not another, finding a 
secret drawer, etc.. There is no attempt to fashion the ‘dyed rags’25 of textual integrity. In this, 
the work resembles Romantic fragments, which were also designed with a deliberately anti-
systematic structure, and Montaigne’s Essais, which are peppered with declarations of their own 
décousu structure. Of course, as in these works, Eremita’s deflection from the artifice of the work 
is part of a highly sophisticated rhetorical strategy to incorporate contingency into the structure 
of the work.  
 Reflecting on the structure of essayistic texts, a rubric under which he includes 
Kierkegaard’s imaginative discourses, Adorno remarks that an essay is always constructed such 
that it could break off at any point.  
 
It thinks in fragments just as reality is fragmented and gains its unity only by moving through the 
fissures, rather than by smoothing them over. The unanimity of the logical order deceives us 
about the antagonistic nature of that on which it was jauntily imposed. Discontinuity is essential 
to the essay, its concern is always a conflict brought to a standstill. (1984, p. 164)  
 
                                                     
 25 F. Schlegel, Critical Fragment 31: ‘many a work of art whose coherence is never questioned is, as the 
artist knows quite well himself, not a complete work but a fragment, or one or more fragments, a mass, a plan. 
But so powerful is the instinct for unity in mankind that the author himself will often bring something to a kind 
of completion which simply can't be made a whole or a unit; often quite imaginatively and yet completely 
unnaturally. The worst thing about it is that whatever is draped about the solid, really existent fragments in the 
attempt to mug up a semblance of unity consists largely of dyed rags.’ 
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In this view, Kierkegaard’s ironic interruption of his texts through different existential 
perspectives or rhetorical/generic registers functions as an alternative to a logical or deductive 
ordering of life, in which order is imposed externally on processes which are essentially 
‘antagonistic’ ‘fissured’ or conflictual.26 Lukács suggests an additional way of understanding the 
significance of these gestures of interruption. After an essayistic text poses its essential question,  
 
something comes from outside – from a reality which has no connection with the 
question nor with that which, as the possibility of an answer, brings forth a new 
question to meet it – and interrupts everything. This interruption is not an end, 
because it does not come from within, and yet it is the most profound ending 
because a conclusion from within would have been impossible. Such an interruption, 
however, can only be viewed humouristically. It has so little connection with that 
which it interrupts [...] But it is also a profound life-symbol – and, for that reason, 
still more profoundly humorous – that the essential is always interrupted by such 
things in such a way. (1971, p. 14) 
 
As in Montaigne’s Essais, the disjunctive, apparently random structure of Kierkegaard’s texts is a 
deliberate strategy meant to highlight the role of contingency in temporal existence. Lukács 
suggests that the structure of lived experience, which the essay attempts to preserve in its form, 
is one in which an organic conclusion or a reconciliation of antagonisms is impossible. Thus the 
way in which the various discussions or perspectives in Kierkegaard’s texts come to an end 
without resolution is in fact ‘the most profound ending’ because this disjunction offers readers 
the occasion to reflect on the open-ended structure of experience in its difference from the 
structure of a conceptual system. Kierkegaard’s ironic interruptions function more specifically as 
a polemical contrast to the Hegelian ‘system’, particularly the movement of the Aufhebung, which 
Kierkegaard viewed as logically and existentially incoherent. In Hegelian logic, particular actuality 
is conceived of as abstract and the whole is considered concrete, which renders difference an 
illusion. ‘What is true is rather found in motion, in a process, however, in which there is rest; 
difference, while it lasts, is but a temporary condition, through which comes unity, full and 
concrete’ (Hegel, ‘Lectures on the History of Philosophy’, 1955, I, pp. 23-25). The system 
reaches its conclusions only by ‘smoothing over’ the difference between thought and being and 
‘abandoning diversity’.27  
 There is much in Kierkegaard’s work to suggest that he shared Lukács’ view of the 
comedy of disjunctive structures deriving from the observation of these same structures in 
                                                     
 26  Kierkegaard’s writing style is one of the key influences on Adorno’s notion of negative dialectics. 
 27 While Hegel and Kierkegaard are both thinkers of motion, Kierkegaard, influenced by the readings 
of the Danish Hegelians, viewed Hegel’s dialectic as effectively arrested by an overarching system. Hegel, for 
Kierkegaard, denied any distinction between thought and being and so failed to take seriously the structure of 
becoming.   
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experience. Lukács opposes essays to works of tragedy, which function according to a logic of 
reconciliation that provides the meaning of the whole at the end. By contrast, the structure of 
the essay is occasional, with external accidents rather than an a priori fate or design determining 
its progression; the ‘occasion’ (anledning—that which leads to) is a major theme in Either/Or and 
appears in a number of Kierkegaard’s works. The character Johannes laments in his diary the 
lack of opportunity to carry out his plans to seduce the young Cordelia because she rarely leaves 
the house of her aunt. In one journal entry, he pleads with chance, declaring:  
 
You whom I love with all my soul, in whose image I form myself [...] I challenge you 
to a fight—why do you not make your appearance? Cursed chance, I am waiting for 
you! Just as a temple dancer dances to the honour of the god [Guden], so I have 
consecrated myself to your service; light, thinly clad, limber unarmed, I renounce 
everything. I own nothing; I desire nothing; I love nothing; I have nothing to lose 
[...] Surprise me—I am ready. (1987, p. 327) 
 
Johannes declares himself ‘ready’ to be surprised by fate, having lightened himself through the 
renunciation of all desires and possessions. In this case, the chance occasion for which he waits 
is a poetic one, since Johannes relies on actuality as ‘material’ for his poetic reflections. Indeed, 
Either/Or links poetic composition in general to the ‘occasion,’ defined as ‘the nothing that lets 
everything come forth’ (1987, p. 236), ‘the extra element for an inner decision to become an 
outer decision’ (1987, p. 234). Within this framework, that which allows possibility to be 
actualised is entirely out of the subject’s hands, since chance, by definition, simply happens and 
cannot be willed. ‘This is a secret implicit in actuality—an offense to the Jews and a foolishness 
to the Greeks. The occasion is always the accidental, and the prodigious paradox is that the 
accidental is absolutely just as necessary as the necessary’ (1987, p. 234). The notion of the 
accidental as necessary is a formulation of the contingency of experience, as expressed by Lukács 
and Adorno, the comic element of existence that is reduplicated in the essay’s discontinuous 
structure.28 Johannes describes it as God’s joke on mankind to have ‘something so insignificant 
and inferior, something people are almost ashamed to talk about in polite society, be absolutely 
part of it all’ (1987, p. 328). Thus Kierkegaard seems to suggest that Johannes’ preparation and 
readiness to be surprised, though in some sense paradoxical and comic, can also be read as a 
healthy openness toward contingency. 
                                                     
 28 The language of Johannes’ description of the occasion also makes it clear that Kierkegaard is 
targeting Hegel’s handling of possibility in the Logic, which Kierkegaard rejects in favour of an Aristotelian 
view.  
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  Johannes’ discussion of the occasion may also contain a clue, albeit in parodic or 
negative form,29 about the role of grace in Christian faith and about the nature of Kierkegaardian 
communication. Across his signed and pseudonymous works, Kierkegaard insists that he cannot 
directly bring another to the truth or to faith, that this exceeds the bounds of what one person 
can do for another. But he nevertheless frequently refers to his work as an ‘occasion’. If one 
were to apply Johannes’ notion of the occasion to this disclaimer in other texts, it would seem 
that Kierkegaard in fact gives his texts quasi-divine status as the arbitrary yet necessary element 
that catalyses the subject as possibility into decisive action. However, this reading relies on 
Johannes getting the concept of the occasion right, and it is more plausible that, like 
Kierkegaard’s other pseudonyms, Johannes the Seducer grasps some, but not all of the truth of his 
subject. This partial failure is suggested by the fact that the aesthete suffers from his dependence 
on chance, forced to receive from the outside what is essential to his being.30 In the Christian 
framework by contrast, the ‘extra element’ of grace required for self-realisation is not wholly 
external to oneself, since it issues from the absolute in which the self is grounded, enabling one 
to become what one truly is (1983, p. 16). This is why, in Fragments, Kierkegaard replaces the 
aesthetic notion of ‘occasion’ with the Christian category of the ‘moment’—in which the eternal 
enters time. What Kierkegaard’s notion of communication seems to share with Johannes’ 
understanding of the occasion is a sense that a subject’s receptivity or openness to that which is 
beyond her ability to control or conceptualise functions as a necessary preliminary step to 
existential ‘actualisation’. Though in the Christian framework only divine grace can help the 
subject to realise herself through faith, Kierkegaard’s negative gestures help the reader to become 
‘light, thinly clad, limber’ enough to make the leap. The underlying dialectic seems to involve 
                                                     
 29 There is ample evidence within the text to suggest that Johannes’ openness to chance is intended to 
be parodic of the receptivity to divine grace in Christianity. Johannes’ plea is specifically a parody of Job’s 
conversation with God, a moment that receives parodic treatment in another of Kierkegaard’s 1843 writings: 
Repetition. Parody in Kierkegaard’s work tends to be used to express a partial truth from within the limited 
perspective of a particular life view. We are given clues in E/O that Johannes’ aesthetically orientated remarks 
are meant to open up a comparison with the parallel Christian notion of grace. Johannes, tellingly, links the 
occasion to the teacher/learner relationship (p. 258) in addition to associating it with composition. This 
constellation of concepts will be familiar to readers of Fragments and the Postscript, as well as Kierkegaard’s 
journal entries on the subject of communication. In Fragments, Kierkegaard makes a crucial distinction between 
the Socratic and the Christian. In a purely immanent Socratic picture, one human being can serve as an occasion 
(and no more) for another to come to the truth, since all subjects possess the capacity to ‘unforget’ the truth. In 
the Christian picture, the subject exists fundamentally in untruth, so an ‘extra element’ is required before one is 
in a position to recognise the truth or make the ‘leap’ of faith. The Christian category for the external power that 
makes the faith possible is grace. Johannes makes a direct analogy between the occasion and grace in his 
declaration that anyone who denies the importance of the occasion in poetic creation is a ‘Pelagian autocrat’—a 
reference to the heretic Pelagius who emphasised free will to the extent of denying the role of grace in Christian 
salvation.  
 30 This is why Kierkegaard identifies boredom as the ultimate existential risk or temptation of the 
aesthetic life.  
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giving up in order to be given to, a ‘double movement’ that is also present in the Abraham story 
in Fear and Trembling.  
 Returning to Victor Eremita’s frame narrative of Either/Or, one sees yet another example 
of the negative strategy of flawed perspectives, as Eremita’s preface provides an additional – 
reflective – point of view on the essays that make up the work. Before the reader is able to begin, 
Eremita performs an initial ‘reading’ of the bundle of texts and, specifically, of the relationship 
between the aesthetically-orientated ‘Either’ reflections with the ethical advice of Judge Wilhelm 
that makes up the ‘Or’ part of the work. He offers what those familiar with Kierkegaard’s other 
works, or those alive to the irony in the text, will recognise as a ‘bad’ reading, wholeheartedly 
endorsing the Judge’s ethical perspective and recommending that subsequent readers follow his 
advice and get married. The irony in the text entails leaving open a possibility for the naive 
reader to think that the work of interpretation has already been carried out by the editor.31 For 
the reflective reader, this device opens up a gap of understanding that can be overcome only by 
the reader’s active involvement in the construction of textual meaning. Eremita’s reading, 
dialectically qualified by the numerous other points of view presented in the work, functions as a 
via negativa that leads readers to a higher perspective not specified within the bounds of the text 
itself. This strategy is in fact characteristic of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous works, all of which 
involve degrees of ‘getting it wrong’ as part of what Kierkegaard deems a ‘continual striving’ 
toward the truth.32  
  
A via negativa to faith 
 Kierkegaard’s negative gestures and intentional misreadings are part of a wider textual 
strategy in the pseudonymous works, described in Concluding Unscientific Postscript as the art of 
‘taking away’. Addressing himself to the upright bourgeois society of 19th-century Denmark, 
Kierkegaard points to the bounties of knowledge – scientific, medical, philosophical, historical, 
                                                     
 31 ‘It is a very good sign when the harmonious bores are at a loss about how they should react to this 
continuous self-parody, when they fluctuate endlessly between belief and disbelief until they get dizzy and take 
what is meant as a joke seriously and what is meant seriously as a joke’ (Schlegel, CF 108). 
 32 Fear and Trembling (1843) follows a similar negative strategy, presenting the limited perspective of 
de Silentio who admits to being unable to understand Abraham. Though the text fails in its stated aim of making 
faith comprehensible to thought, it does so in a way that brings the reader closer to faith, even if getting closer 
takes the form of acknowledging that one does not understand or does not feel capable of the leap. Likewise in 
Repetition (1843), Constantine Constantius tries and fails to achieve ‘repetition’ in attempting to recreate à la 
lettre a trip to Berlin he took years earlier. Though neither of the two main characters in the narrative fully 
grasps what is at stake in repetition, which is ultimately a Christian and not an aesthetic category, their attempts 
put the movement into relief by showing what it is not: irony, recollection, mediation, hope, Heraclitian flux, 
Eleatic stasis. 
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technological – achieved in his lifetime but confronts the nagging sense that it hasn’t been 
appropriated, that knowledge has piled up in a rapid and fragmented fashion.  
 
When a man has filled his mouth so full of food that for this reason he cannot eat 
and it must end with his dying of hunger, does giving food to him consist in stuffing 
his mouth even more or, instead, in taking a little away do that he can eat? Similarly, 
when a man is very knowledgeable but his knowledge is meaningless or virtually 
meaningless to him, does sensible communication consist in giving him more to 
know […]? [...]When a communicator takes a portion of the copious knowledge that 
the very knowledgeable man knows and communicates it to him in a form that 
makes it strange to him, the communicator is, as it were, taking away his knowledge, 
at least until the knower manages to assimilate the knowledge by overcoming the 
resistance of the form [...] taking away is precisely communication. (1992, p. 275) 
 
This remarkable passage elaborates a therapeutic textual strategy of writing as a kind of 
subtraction, set within the context of excessive knowledge or knowledge drained of significance. 
The critical tradition of the essay to which I argue Kierkegaard belongs is uniquely positioned to 
reflect this shift in focus from the content of knowledge to one’s relationship to knowledge – 
with the characteristic first-person perspective and the variety of ironic strategies employed to 
call any discursive frame into question. Looking back to Socrates33 and anticipating 20th-century 
modernist and surrealist strategies of Verfremdung, Climacus describes his procedure as ‘making 
strange’ the knowledge to which one has become indifferent, presenting knowledge in a form 
that is unfamiliar and so forcing the subject to repeat or appropriate that knowledge, (as if) for 
the first time. The aim of digestion, appropriation, repetition then takes the place of the aim of 
discovery, penetration, and acquisition. Reckoning with one’s actual position or condition, rather 
than ‘going further’ serves as a precondition for any genuine conversion or opening within 
existence.  
 The description of communication as ‘taking away’ occurs within a work that takes as its 
central concern the question of how a finite subject can enter into a relationship with infinite 
Being, or how the finite can gain eternal significance. Cautioning against a world-denying 
transcendence, Kierkegaard faces the historical and temporal as a necessary part of the Christian 
dialectic, evidenced by the event of God entering time. Kierkegaard makes it his task to address 
his own historical moment—in comic, sometimes bitter polemics—as a way of helping readers 
to begin where they are, to ‘digest’ or to acknowledge their position. Thus Climacus declares in 
the opening of Concluding Unscientific Postscript that in contrast to the systematisers: ‘I remain 
where I am’ (1992, p. 16). This kind of contingent starting point, rather than a speculative 
                                                     
 33 That Kierkegaard took the ironic Socrates as a model of communication is evident across the whole 
of his authorship, with Fragments proclaiming that midwifery ‘remains highest relationship between human 
beings’ (1985, pp. 10-11). 
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beginning from first principles, is typical of the essayistic, which seeks to relate itself to existence 
and so can only ever begin in medias res. In a complacently Christian society, the task facing 
Kierkegaard was to help his readers to remember what it was to be a Christian, as ‘the only 
unforgiveable high treason against Christianity is the single individual’s taking his relation to it 
for granted’ (Ibid). In such an environment, delivering the knowledge of Christianity in the 
unfamiliar form of an imaginative discourse on the relationship between Socrates and Christ 
(Fragments), a dialectic between the tragic hero and the knight of faith (Fear and Trembling) or a 
psychological study (The Sickness unto Death, The Concept of Anxiety) was a way to make readers 
acknowledge their own starting point and thus to open up the question of their relationship to 
the infinite, which familiarity and convention had closed off.  
 Fear and Trembling is exemplary of this strategy of reorienting the vision of readers so that 
they might see themselves anew as possibility, stripped of the usual pretensions and assurances. 
The work’s author, Johannes de Silentio, turns to the subject of Abraham as the father of faith, 
trying and failing to make the movement of faith comprehensible to thought. His initial Socratic 
admission that he is incapable of understanding Abraham offers readers an opportunity to 
likewise suspend – or at least re-evaluate – what they believe they know about one of the central 
figures in Judeo-Christian history. Rather than beginning from the position of the pastor’s 
sermon, in which doubt is condemned as failing to accept what ‘only the most ignorant would 
dare to deny’ (1992, p. 12), De Silentio’s rhetorical position actively encourages doubt, inviting 
readers to join the author in admitting to themselves their inability to understand the matter of 
faith. To reinforce this aim of suspension or questioning, de Silentio offers a number of 
conflicting perspectives in the text. The ‘Attunement’ section that opens the book presents 
imaginative versions of the biblical Abraham and Isaac story, each emphasising a different aspect 
of the narrative and a different way of understanding Abraham’s actions. In one moving version, 
Isaac sees the knife tremble in Abraham’s hand and is unable to ever have faith again, 
understanding that God has commanded his murder. In another, Abraham goes through the 
motions of faith, offering up Isaac, but in his soul he ‘becomes old’ and loses his taste for life as 
a result of the strain of God’s trial. This strategy of different perspectives carries through the 
whole of the work, which unfolds as a series of assays to get closer to the reality of faith, each 
attempt ultimately failing.  
 In this way, as Climacus describes in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, the reader is brought 
‘as close as possible’ to the question of how to live. 
 
Instead of presenting the good in the form of actuality, as is ordinarily done, that 
this person and that person have actually lived and have actually done this, and thus 
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transforming the reader into an observer, an admirer, an appraiser, it should be 
presented in the form of possibility. Then whether or not the reader wants to exist in 
it is placed as close as possible to him. (1992, pp. 358-359, my emphasis) 
 
 We have seen a number of strategies by which Kierkegaard develops the inherent 
openness of essayistic writing, particularly with respect to the subject viewed as possibility rather 
than as a fixed identity or as part of a conceptual system. Possibility is for Kierkegaard the logical 
category of temporal existence or becoming, and part of his task as a writer is to actively engage 
his audience’s sense of the anxiety or uncanniness of existence, since one is never fully present, 
fully at home; as long as one stands in medias res, rather than at the end, the significance of a life is 
always being worked out. Doubt – in Fear and Trembling – is the recognition of this uncanny 
feature of the human, a premonition that human existence is not merely finite but contains the 
possibility of the infinite or unconditioned. 
 
The sublime in the everyday 
 Finally, Kierkegaard’s essayism offers the possibility of the existential –though not 
conceptual – reconciliation of finite and the infinite. The pseudonymous author of Fear and 
Trembling considers the leap into faith impossibly difficult, as it involves staking one’s life on that 
which is beyond conceptualisation, or, as Climacus later describes it in Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript, on an ‘objective absurdity’. Yet, from the outside, the extraordinary knight of faith 
looks entirely pedestrian—so much so that De Silentio asks in amazement, ‘can that really be 
him? He looks just like a tax collector!’ The image of the faithful one chatting with shopkeepers 
and looking forward with relish to the humble domestic scene of dinner at home with his wife is 
certainly at odds with the arduous and angst-ridden psychological effort that Kierkegaard, in his 
polemical attempt to ‘raise the price’ of faith, attributes to the process of becoming a subject. But 
the contradiction in Kierkegaard’s account of faith is a reminder that the leap of faith he 
envisions is not a leap into another world or a choice by which the subject, like the systematic 
philosopher, denies the conditions of temporal existence. On the contrary, the portrait of the 
knight of faith in Fear and Trembling suggests that faith, unlike doubt or ‘infinite resignation’, is a 
movement that allows one to live fully in the everyday, to evidence ‘the sublime in the 
pedestrian’ (1994, p. 52). Thus Abraham comes to resemble something like the ideal philosopher 
of the ancient sceptics, who, having questioned everything, is able to achieve tranquillity in 
common life. But where the ancient sceptic actively works to maintain his withholding of assent, 
Abraham maintains his passionate interest in or desire for the finite—embodied in the person of 
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Isaac.34 Like the sceptics though, whom De Silentio praises for maintaining doubt as a lifelong 
task, Abraham’s apparently effortless pedestrianism requires the everyday work of rejecting the 
inveiglements of cognition, an on-going dance of the temporal and eternal.  
 Crucially, the leap exemplified by Abraham does not come as a result of effort alone, 
though is indeed takes effort to become ‘light’ enough for the leap—that is, to renounce one’s 
own understanding. Kierkegaard helps in this task through his negative writing strategies of 
‘taking away’. There are no guarantees in this approach that the reader will be led to faith, rather 
than to sceptical withholding of judgement or even to despair. The negative project can, at best, 
lead to a positive orientation of receptivity or radical openness. In purely immanent sense, this 
means accepting that I am always other than myself in time or becoming. In a spiritual sense it 
concerns relating myself to something radically other, something unthinkable and yet something 
that grounds my being. The tension of myself as the object of speculation and myself as I am, as 
a possible opening to the infinite, is one that Kierkegaard seeks to keep alive even for the 
believer, such that faith is not a transition into rest, which would for Kierkegaard be the 
equivalent of spiritual suicide. He introduces the category of repetition (gjentagelsen), desiring what 
one already has, in order to maintain the continued striving of existence against the temptation 
to become what Sartre would later call the en-soi, and what Kierkegaard refers to as death or 
fantasy existence. ‘Even if a person has achieved the highest, the repetition by which he must 
indeed fill out his existence, if he is not to go backward (or become a fantastical being), will again 
be a continued striving, because here in turn the conclusiveness is moved ahead and postponed’ 
(1992, p. 121). The only temporal dialectic available in which the subject does not either rush 
ahead to see herself as already actualised and reified (1992, p. 146) or does not try sneak 
backwards out of existence, as the Greeks recollected their way to union with the Ideal, is 
repetition—desiring to become what one is (2009, p. 3), which involves an opening to infinite 
possibility within time, within the humble scenes of daily life.  
 This dialectic is reinforced and encouraged in Kierkegaard’s writings. The movement of 
‘going further’ that de Silentio criticises in Fear and Trembling is replaced with the spatial metaphor 
of beginning where one is, which, like becoming oneself, another key metaphor, is not a given 
but is something to be achieved. The task of working out where one’s interest lies can be 
understood as part of the larger aim in essayistic writing to ‘leave everything as it is’. In both 
there is an emphasis on the transformative power of seeing or acknowledging things as they are, 
                                                     
 34 As Kierkegaard notes in Fragments, ‘belief and doubt are opposite passions’ (1994, Interlude). The 
sceptic achieves tranquility through the decisive act – constantly renewed – to withhold judgement about what 
presents itself to his senses. The Christian chooses, with ‘infinite interest’ to believe that for which there is not 
only insufficient evidence but which evidence positively argues against, that which is objectively impossible.  
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with the understanding that this necessitates continual striving. The shape of these movements, 
and of essayistic writing more generally, is circular: what one is or knows is revisited or returned 
to in a gesture of repetition that entails both newness and what was already there as possibility. 
The next chapter will explore Stanley Cavell’s development of the theme of repetition into a 
notion of the everyday as a task or an achievement – a prize reclaimed from scepticism – 
reinforced through the philosophical form of the essay.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
